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The purpose of  this paper  is  to present  an  example of  the
so-called  Computable General  Equilibrium  (CGE) models which  were
introduced  into the  Applied  Economics  literature  just  a  little
more  than  a  decade  ago  and  proved  to  be  very  useful  for  both
medium/long-term  planning  and  development  policy  analysis
exercises.  The underlying motivation  for  such modelling has
ari  sen  in  r-esp-onse  to the  well.-known  short-comings and
limitations  of  the partial  equilibrium  constructs.
Due  to  the  complexities  and  the  interwoven  structure  of  the
real  world  economies,  applied  policy  analysts  have  always  been
skeptical  about  the  anaLlytical  powers  of  partial  equilibrium
models. Thus, the  growing  need  for  increasingly  general  models
has  led  to  the  explicit  aim  of  converting  the  Walrasian  general
equi librium  system  from  an  abstract  mathematical  apparatus  (as
was  formalized  by  Kenneth  Arrow,  Gerard  Debreu  and  others  in  the
195)0s) into  a realistic  and  applicable  model  of  actual
economi es.
The  CGE  Mode:l.s  have,  until  now, been  successfully applied  to
many  countries,  addressing  different  policy  questions.-  :  L  To
cite  some  examples,  the  existing  models  include,  but  not  limited
to:  Taylor  &  Black  (1974,  Chile) ;  Adelman  &  Robinson  (1978,  S.
Korea);  Dervis  &  Robinson  (1978,  Turkey);  Ahluwalia  &  Lysy  (1979,
Malaysia) ;  Cardoso  &  Taylor  (1979,  Brazil);  de  Melo  (1980,  Sri
Lanka).  Feltenstein  (1980,  Argentina).  de  Melo  &  Robinson  (1980,
Colombia),  Lewis  &  Urata  (1983,  Turkey)  ;  Lundborg  (1984,
Malaysia);  Gupta  &  Togan  (1984,  India,  Kenya  and  Turkey).The paper  first  introduces the  broad  class  of  general
equilibrium, macro models that  are antecedent to the  contemporary
CGE formulations.  There,  I  try  to  provide  an  interpretative
essay on  such early  multi-sector constructs and follow the path
to the evolution of  the  idea of  building  price-endogenous, non-
linear  macro models that  can  capture both  the market-optimization
behavior of  individual  agents and the commanding nature of  the
exogenously specified government  policies.
The  second and  third  sections in  turn, build the  different
segments of  the  CGE model.  The paper concludes with  a compact
presentation of  the  core CGE equations and  two Appendices, one
on  the Linear Expenditure  System:  and  another on  the  endogenous
derivation  of  the price  elasticity  of  demand,  both  of  which  will
be  used  in the  modelling process.
1.  INTRODUCTION:  A PRELUDE TO THE CGE MODELS
The earliest multisector planning models were based  on the
simple  input-output  linkages among  various  sectors of  the
economy.  With  these models, assuming a fixed-cofficients  --
Leontieff  --  Technology for each  sector, and  given  the  estimates  of
input-output  coefficients across sectors, the planner  was in  a
position to  calculate the necessary output  level  at  each  sector
in  order  to satisfy a targeted  final  consumption bundle.
To be more concise, letting  A be the matrix  of  fixed
input-output  coefficients  as.ij,  with a±j  being the amount  of
input  i necessary to  produce 1 unit  of  opuput  j;  and  denoting
gross output  vector by  X, and  the final  consumption vector  by  C,the  material-balance  equation  can  be  written  as:
X  AX  +  C  (I-1)
Now,  suppose- the  planner  has  some  targeted  consumption
bundle,  indicated  by  the  vector  C  'Then  the  "solution"  to  the
problem  can  be  found  by  solving  the  material-balance  equation
for  X:
X  =  (I  - A) . C  (1-2)
Equation  (1-2) gives  gross  production  requirements  i.n  order  to
satisfy  the  targeted  consumption  demand.
Leaving  aside  the  rather  simplistic  and  cumbersome  nature  of
the  static,  fixed  i n put-"out p ut  model  .i  ng,  thIe  most.  i mportan t
drawback  of  such  models  has  been  the  lack  of  an  optimization
criteria  for  setting  the  targeted  consumpti-on  bundle,  C.  Yet,  in
the  absence  of  such  criteria,  the  determination  of  C,  and  hence
of  the  gross  output  vector  X,  becomes  an  ad  hoc  exercise  in
matrix  algebra.
Later,  another  class  of  multisector  models,  known as  Linear
F'rogr-ammin  ig  Models  succeeded  in  overcoming  th i s,  and  many  other
shortcomings  of  the  early  input-output  exercises.  cr  Here  an
explicit  objective  function  was introduced  and the  problem
involved  optimizing  this  function  subject to  certain  (linear)
constraints.  Again,  retaining  the  same  notation  for  X  and  A,  the
static  linear  programming  model  can  be  formulated  as  follows:
Max  RX  s.t.  Ax  :i:  B
X  U::  0where  R  is  a  vector  of  objective  function  weights  and  B  is  a
vector  of  resource  constraints.  Given  data  on  R,  A  and  B,  if  the
feasible  set  F  =  {XIAX  :i  B;  X  :  0  is  bounded  and  non-empty,  then
a  solution  vector  X*  can  be  found  to  the  above  problem.  < ""
Linear  Programming  Models  coupled  with  the  so-called  Duality
Theorems  have  provided  interesting  implications  for  economic
problems.  In  particular,  given  the  above  linear  programming
problem  (primal),  the  dual  problem  could  be  written  as:
Min  WB  s.t.  WA  R
W  C)
where  W  is  a  vector  of  constants.  Now,  the  Duality  Theorem
states  that  a  feasible  vector,  X*,  for  the  primal  problem  is
optimal  if  and  only  if  a  feasible  vector  W exists for  the  dual
problem;  such  that,
W* AX*--B)  = 0  (I-3)
(WA  - R)  X*  =  0  (I-4')
Equations  (1-3)  and  (1-4)  together  constitute  the
complementary  slackness  conditions.  Decomposing  (1-3)  and  (1-4)
we  can  get  the  following  relations:
W',  >  0  implies  Ea.i  X'*  - BE  =  O  (1-5)
j
La)jX"j  - Bj  >  0  implies  W*  =  0  (I-6)
j
X "  >  0  implies  EW'*aAj  - Rj  == 0  (I-7)
i
EW"ia,..a  - R  >  0  implies  X~ *  C=  0  (I-8)
i
Thus,  in  general  if,  at  optimum,  any  one  of  the  constraints
4in  either  problems  is  not  binding  (i.e.  is  either  strictly
negative  or  strictly  positive)  then  the  corresponding  dual
variable  carries  a  zero  value,
To  carry  the  analysis  a  little  further,  if  we  interpret  the
B  vector  as  fixed  supplies  of  inputs,  the  R  vector  as  objective
function  weights,  and  the  elements  of  matrix.  A  as  input
requirements  of  per  unit  output  levels,  the  complementary
slackness  conditions  naturally  allows  us  to  interpret  the  dual
multipliers,  vector  W,  as  "input  prices".  In  this  context,
equations  (I-5)  and  (1-6)  state  that  only  fully  used  inputs  have
positive  prices  and  for  those  inputs  where  the  fi:xed  supply
ex.ceeds  demand,  the  associated  price  must  be  zero.  Further,  (1-
7)  and  (1-8)  state  that  only  those  activities  which  do  not  incur
any  losses  at  the  optimum  must  actually  be  carried  out  at
positive  levels.
Thus,  the  linear  programming  approach  provides  interesting
insights  for  the  general  equi librium  relationships  of  the
modelled  economies.  However,  the  fact  that  the  dual  multipliers
share  the  marginality  conditions  of  market  prices  at  the  opt:i.mum,
should  not  be  taken  to  imply  that  they  share  other  properties  of
market  prices  as  well.  First  of  all,  such  models  are  based  on
the  heuristic  assumption  that  a  fictitious  planner,  in  command  of
all  physical  productive  activities  of  the  economy,  yet  subject  to
certain  technological  and  natural  constraints,  seeks  to  maximize
a  wellI-defined  welfare  function  for  the  whole  society.  They  are,
thus,  .. Cit. well-suited,  nor  designed  f or  the  state-capital  i st
mixed  economies  where  individual  agents  independently  try  tomax:imize  their  own  well-being  subject  to  a  budget  constraint  in
an  environment  regulated  by  the  government  bureaucracy  at  varying
degrees.  In  this  environment,  individual  agents  taken  together
determine  certain  outcomes  that  can  be  affected  only  indirectly
by  the  planner.  The  planner  does  not  have  real  command  on  all
the  productive  activities  of  the  economy,  but  relies  on  the
decisions  of  many  other  independent  "optimizers",  each  exerting
an  influence on  the specific  development path  of  the economy.
The  remedy  to this  observation  is,  of  course,  to construct  a
model  where endogenous prices and quantities are  allowed  to
transmit  market  information  through  different sectors  of  the
economy, thereby simulating the  workings of  a  perhaps regulated
and  intervened,  yet  absolutely  decentralized  (i.e.  not  commanded
by  a  social  planner)  markets.  Yet,  this  -level  of  price
endogeneity  cannot  be  designed  within  the  realm  of  the  linear
programming  models.  To  cite  the  main  problem,  "the  crucial
difficulty  lies  in  the  fact  that  economic  behavior  and  relations
such  as  budget  constraints,  consumption  functions,  and  saving
functions  must  be  expressed  in  current  endogenous  factor  and
commodity  prices.  But  the  standard  primal  constraint  equations
of  a  linear  program  cannot  include  th'e  "shadow"  prices  that
result  as  a  by-product  of  the  maximization.  Or,  to  put  it
differently,  one  cannot  in  general  expect  that  the  resource
allocation  and  production  structure  determined  by  the  solution  of
a  linear  program  is  consistent  with  the  incomes  and  budgets  that
result  from  its  dual  solution.  Indeed,  if  factor  prices  have  any
impact  on  the  structure  of  demand,  the  quantities  supplied  that
are  the  outcome  of  the  primal  solution  will  in  general  not  equal
6the  quant.tites  demanded  that  are  implied  by  the  dual
sol  ut  i  on 1  ".  •
In  general,  those  models  which  enable  this  price  endogeneity  on
the  one  hand,  and  incorporate  the  fundiamental  general  equii  brium
linkages  between  the  incomes  of  various  worker--consumer  groups  and
the  resulting  patterns  of  demand  on  the  other,  are  termed  Computable
General  Equilibrium  (CGE)  models.  This  paper  is  about  one  su.ch
model  that  inc:orp'orates  the  :international  economy  as  well  as  the
domestic  markets  into  the  analysis.  Given  an  arbitrary  set  of
prices,  the  model  solves  for  the  output  levels  across  sectors  and
finds  the  market  clearing  wage/rental  rates.  These  in  turn
become  te  so:urces  o)f  income  generation  for  various  household
groups  and  determine  the  pattern  of  demand.  OQuantities  imported
and  exported  are  solved  as  a  function  of  domestic  production
costs,  international  prices  and  relevant  elasticities.  The
investment  behavior  is  also  endogenized  through  the  saving
patterns  and  sectoral  investment  share  parameters,  which,  in  turn
are  determined  as  a  function  of  differential  profit  rates  across
sectors.  After  calculating  excess  demands  in  this  manner,  the
model  updates  the  initial  guess  of  do.mestic  prices  through  a
Walrasian  tatonnement  algorithm  and  iterates  the  whole  process
until  convergence  is  achieved.
It  should  be  noted,  however,  that  the  model  designed  in  this
paper  can  only  solve  for  the  relative  prices  and  the
real..L  variables  of  the  economy.  Yet  to  achieve  this,  the  planner
has  to  feed  a  normalization  rule  into  the  model,  a  completely
exogenous  practice.  The  rule  most  commonly  resorted  to  and  whichwill  also  be used here  is  to employ  a no-inflation benchmark by
defining  a  constant  level  of  the  price  index,  which  is  set
exogenously  by  the  modeller.  This  choice  is  quite  consistent
with  the  early  treatment  of  Walrasian  General  Equilibrium  Models,
in  which  only  relative  prices  and  real  variables  would  matter,
without  much  concern  devoted  to  monetary  problems.  Thus,  using
such  a  normalization  rule  precludes  the  treatment  of  monetary
phenomena as  well  as  the  possibility of  using  such  models  for
very  short-run,  stabilization  analyses.
On  the  one  hand,  incorporation  of  the  interactions between
the  real  and  monetary  spheres  of  the  economy  in  a  general
equilibrium  framework  is  still  a very difficult branch  of
economic  theory;  and  building  an  ad  hoc  macro-monetary
superstructure  interwoven  with  the  microeconomic  general
equilibrium  system  through  simple  behavioral  equations  will  have
its  own  drawbacks  as  an  analytical  tool.  Further,  such
an  exercise  may  turn  out  to  be  too  general  and  cumbersome  to  be  a
useful  model  for  focusing  on  a  vast  array  of  development  issues.
These  arguments  should  not  be  taken,  however,  to  imply  that
planning monetary phenomena is not possible or  ill-advised  all
together.  Depending on  the question  in  hand  and the time horizon  to  be
analyzed, the monetary sphere of  the  economy can  be  incorporated
into the CGE framework  in  various ways.  For  example, a very
elegant  model  that  tackled  this  task  quite  effectively  is  provided
by  Adelman  and  Robinson  in  their  1978  work,  which  focuses  on  the
income  distribution  consequences  of  different  development
strategies  in  South  Korea.
Thus,  to  recapilulate,  the  reader  has  to  appreciate  the  fact
8that  in  applied  policy  analyses  much depends  on  the specific
purpose of  the  model-building effort and  the  access  to realistic
data supplies, which  is  still  a  major  restraint  on  students of
Development  Economi  cs.
The Model  constructed  in  this paper  is  adapted  and  updated
from the  works of  Dervis  et.  al.  (1982);  Dervis  and  Robinson
(1978);  Lewis and Urata  (1983);  Adelman  and  Robinson  (1978)  and
Lundborg  (1984).  Its distinguishing features are:  (1)  expliicit
specification  of  the public  enterprises  as  distinct from private
enterprises;  (2)  recognition  of  monopoly power  in  certain
product markets;  (3) recognition  of  inter-sectoral  wage
differences for  the  same type  of  labor;  and  (4)  endogenous
calculation  of  the sectoral  expor't  subsidies arising  from export-
incentive-pack:ages  granted  by  the government.
The Model  is constructed  and  designed  to be  run  in  two
stages.  The first stage  is  a  within-period general  equilibrium
construction  which  is static  in  its  equations and  variables.
Given certain exogenous government policy variables  and  other
parameters, the Stage  1 Model,  as will  be called hereafter,  finds
the relative  prices and  solves  for  all  real/structural  variables
of  the economy.  In  other  words, it  comprises the core system of
the overall  Model.
The second  stage, on  the other  hand,  is designed  to  up-date
the  exogenous variables  of  the  first stage.  It  is  a  dynamic
system and  basically used for  the  purpose of  "aging" the  Model.
Armed with this background we can begin  constructing  our
model.  I  first  introduce the system  of  ncotation  that  will  be
9used  throughout  the  entire  Model.  Unless  otherwise  specified,  I
adhered  to  the  following  legend  of  principles:
(1)  Endogenous  variables  are  denoted  by  capital  letters  without
any  bar  (-)  on  them.  All  capital  letters  with  a  bar,  and
lower  case  letters  (with  the  exception  of  d.  and  rm)  are
exogenous  variables  or  fixed  parameters  in  the  Stage  1
Model  which  needs  to  be  updated  in  the  second  stage.
(2)  All  Greek  letters  are  parameters  not  variables.
(3)  Letters  with  a  circumflex  (..)  are  policy  variables  to  be  set
exogenously  by  the  government.
(4)  Time  subscripts  are  omitted  for  all  variables  unless  there
are  time  lags  involved.  Thus,  unless  otherwise  specified
explicitly,  all  variables  refer  to  the  current  period.
(5)  The  subscripts  i  and  j  are  used  for  sectors.  They  always
range  from  1  to  n.  When  these  two  are  used  together
(e.g.  a:j,  or  bj.),  the  first  subscript  always  refers  to  the
sector  of  origin  and  the  second  to  the  sector  of
destination.
(6)  The  subscript  s  refers  to  different  skill  types  of  labor  and
ranges  from  1  to  m.
(7)  Subscript  f  is  used  to  distinguish  between  the  private  and
the  public  firm  (p:  private;  g:  public).
10II  - THE OPEN CGE MODEL:  STAGE  1
The  core  equations  of  the  Stage  1  Model  in  their  expilicit
functional  forms  are  constructed  in  this  section.  We  first  begin
with  the  presentation  of  the  price  system.
PR ICES
The  specification  of  the  price  system  in  an  open  economy
model  presents  some  interesting  problems  to  the  applied  model
builder.  To  begin  with,  in  the  absence  of  any  trade
restrictions,  invokiing  the  neo-classical  assumptions,  that  the
tradables  are  perfect  substitutes  and  that  the  country  being
modelled  is  too  small  to  affect  the  world  prices,  implies  that
the  domestic  relative  prices  are  set  by  the  given  world  price
ratios.  Thus,  there  remains  no  independent,  or  endogenous,  price
system  for  the  model  to  solve  at  all.  The  prices  for  the  open
economy  model  are  determined  in  the  international  markets  and
these  should  be  fed  into  the  model  as  given,  fixed  variables.
However,  in  practice,  especially  when  we  are  trying  to  build
models  with  limited  degrees  of  disaggregation  of  the  productive
sectors,  the  perfect  substitubility  assumption  greatly
exaggerates  the  role  of  the  international  price  system  and  the
domestic  trade  policy  over  determination  of  the  domestic  price
system.  The  applied  macro  models,  due  to  the  understable  reasons
of  computation,  data  limitations,  etc.,  involve  a  fair  amount  of
aggregation  of  sectoral  activities,  and  at  such  levels  of
aggregation  the  perfect  substitubility  assumption  may  lead  to
quite  misleading  results.
Another  difficulty,  as  illustrated  by  Dervis  et.  al.  ( 1982,
11Chapter  3)  is  that  assuming  the  above  mentioned  neo-classical
hypotheses  along  with  the  specification of  the productive
technology as  one  of  constant  returns to scale,  result  in
extreme specialization  in  the sectors that the domestic economy
has comparative advantage, with  no home production ever  on  the
sectors that  it  doesn't have.  Obviously, this  is  a  very  crude
portrayal  of  the way economies engage  into international  trad.e
and  is  not  supported by  empirical  evidence.  Two-way  sectoral
trade  is  abound,  especially at  high  levels of  aggregation.
A formulation  to handle these problems has been  proposed in
a  1969 paper  by  Armington which  distinguishes  commodities  not
only  by  their  kind  - e.g.  machinery,chemical  - but  also by  their
place of  production.  In  Armington's commodity system, not  only
is  each good different  from  any other good,  but  also each
good  is assumed  to be  differentiated by the country of  origin
of  supply.
Following Armington's hypothesis, domestically produced
goods and  imports are  assumed to  be  imperfect substitutes.  To
reflect  this, we define  a tradable composite commodity CCI,  which
is  a CES aggregation  of  the  domestic commodity  DC:t,  and  the
imported  foreign  good,  M±.  The elasticity  of  substitution  of  the
CES  function, ai,  reflects the differences between  the domestic
and  imported good  from the buyer's viewpoint  (the smaller the as ,
the greater  the difference between  DC±  and  M1  and  the harder  to
substitute them with  each  other).  Plausibly in  sectors such as
agriculture, food  processing  or  textiles,  aC  is  fairly large,
whereas for  'the  capital  goods sectors it  is  quite low.
12The  ex.plicit  .formulation of  the  composite  commodity  in  the
i-th  sector  is:
---  ":i.  -P  -I/P/  (
CC:  =  B I.  M,.  +  (  -8,.)  DC  (II-  )
where  BS  ,  S.  and  p  . are  parameters;  with  S  G  giving  the  share  of
the  imported  good  in  CCI  and  p:.i  is  related  to  the  elasticity  of
substitution,  o•  by  the  expression  ao  =  1 /+pi.
The  consumers  are  then  hypothesized  as  mi.nimizing  a  co(st
function  subject  to  the  CES  composite  commodity  "technoology"
just  like  a  firm  trying  to  produce  a  specified  level  of  output  at
mini mum  cost.  Accordingly  M  1  and  DC,.  are  like  "inputs"  producing
the  aggregate  output  CC±..  "Therefore,  the  composite  good  price,
PC-.,  can  be  exipressed  u.sing  the  cost  function  of  the  CES
te  I:  hnol.  gy <  >
ff±  ( i-C  :k)  Cy±.  ( l-cr,.)  1  I--
PC  . =  1 / B  . PM  . +  (1 - 6  )  F D,.  1  (  I :-2)
where  PM.i is  the  domestic  c.urrency  price  of  the  imported  good,
wh:i ch  will  be  determined  by  the  world  price  F'WM:.,  the  ad  valorem
tariff  rate  tm±.,  and  the  ex-change  rate  ER  (defined  as  units  of
domestic  currency  per  unit  of  foreign  currency,  usually  dollar).
FPM  :  =  PFWM  (1+tm,.)  ER  (I  I-3)
To  complete  the  specification  of  the  price  system  I  will
also  introduce  the  net  price,  PN-=.,  upon  which  the  producers  make
their- product ti  on  pl an s.  Thus;
P N.:i  =  PD.  "-  EPCj  ac 1   - tn.  PD,.  +  sn-c  PDF).  (11 -4)
where  tni  is  the  indirect  tax  rate  and  sn.i:  is  the  net  productionsubsidy.  Depending  on  the  government's  attitude  towards  private
versus  public  enterprises,  the  granted  subsidy  rate  is
differentiated  among  firms  as  well  as  across  sectors.  Further,
aji  stands  for  the  amount  of  intermediate  input  j  used  for  the
production  of  one  unit  of  i.  Hence  EPCjaj.  gives  the  value  of
J -t
intermediate  inputs  used  in  the  production  of  one  unit  of  the
i-th  good.
The  two  other  prices  used  in  the  Model,  the  price  of
capital,  PKý  and  the  export  price,  PWEI  will  be  introduced  below,
at  a  later  point  of  the  Stage  1  Model.  At  this  juncture,
however,  I  will  turn  to  the  specification  of  the  production
technology  of  the  economy.
PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY AND FACTOR MARKETS
The  crucial  assumption  in  constructing  the  productive  sphere
of  the  Open  CGE  Model  is  that  each  sector  is  envisaged  to  produce
a  single  commodity  (may  be  thought  as  an  aggregate-commodity  in
the  Hicksian  sense).  Conversely,  each  such  commodity  is
associated  with  a  single  production  sector  of  the  economy.  This
specification,  very  much  in  the  tradition  of  early  economy-wide
models,  enables  us  to  continue  to  define  the  productive  sectors
as  entries  of  an  input-output  table.
As  hinted  in  the net-price equation  (II-4),  the  intermediate
input demands has been  assumed to  constitute a  linear system with
fixed-coefficient production technology for  such  input-usage..
The retention  of  this  specification  is not necessary for  the  non-
linear  CGE Model  and extensions of  this technology have been
14t ried  in  Lewis  and  Urata  (1983)  and  also  in  Ahluwalia  and  Lysy
(1979).  For  purposes  of  realism  we  may  need  to  separate
the  technol]ogy  of  intermediate  inputs  from  the  production
technol.ogy  for  primary  inp.uts  - capital  and  labor,  Our
specification  is  perhaps  the  simplest  way  to  achieve  this.
In  particular,  the  production  technology  available  to  a
firm  can  be  thought  to  be  given  by  either  a  one-  or  a  two-]evel
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X.f±i  =  A.r  K.i  Tr  LI.U  ±  (11-5)
or
X f'-.  =  A  i  Kf  L.  I.... .~  . ( II-6)
where  L.:  is  further  formulated  as  a  CES  aggregation  of
di ff:erent  skill  levels  (11-7  below).
The  modeller  can  choo)se  either  of  the  spec if  icat ion  for  the
produc.tion  technology  for  a  particular  firm  or  sector,  However,
the  two,-level  Cobb-Douglas  technology  seems  to  be  more  realistiic
because  it  is  very  unlikely  that  the  elasticity  of  substitution
between  all  types  of  labor  is  the  same  and  equal  to  that  between
labor  types  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  capital  on  the  other,  as  was
assumed  in  formulation  (II-5).
Then,  I  will  retain  the  two-level  Cobb-Douglas  technology
for  the  Model.  For  such  technology,  capital  is  thought  as  a
f  i. xed-coeff  i  ci  ents,  composite  good  with  elements  b.j•  ,  where  b.i  j
i s  the  amount  of  c api tal  good  originating  from  sector  i  that  will
be  used  to  make  up  one  unit  of  real  capital  in  sector  j.
15Further,  capital  stock  is assumed  to be fixed  in the within-
period  modelling  of  the  first  stage.  This  assumption  tries  to
capture  the fact  that capital  is  not  "malleable",  i.e.  that
combine machines  once  installed  cannot  be  converted  into trucks
easily.
The  labor  parameter,  Li±,  of  the  Cobb-Douglas  production
technology  is  given  by  a  further  CES  aggregation  of  m  different
skill  types.  Thus;
I,,  . =  L-  .i  (L-  ,...  ,  L.  i m)  ( II-7)
»'n
where  L.F:R.o- "  R-,  is  a  CES function  of  skill  categories.  So we
distinguish between  m  skill  levels  in  the  Model.
More  detailed  specifications of  the  production  technology
are  of  course  possible.  However,  more  detailed  specifications  of
the  production  functions  mean  more  parameters  that  need  to  be
estimated,  and  the  applied  modeller  always  faces  the  trade  off
between  vigorous  functional  specification  and  parameter
estimation.  The  CES  and  two-level  Cobb-Douglas  functional  forms
used  here  require  a  "moderate"  degree  of  parameter  estimation
and  have,  reportedly  yielded  quite  realistic  results  in  real
world  applications  (see  References).
Now,  to  turn  to  the  mathematical  properties  of  the
production  technology  of  our  model,  we  should  first  distinguish
between  the gross production possibility set  Xf  =  {Xf  ,..  ,X,  n
from  the nDt.  production possibility set,  which  is:
II  N  N
X÷  . ",CX  . :i.  I  X . -- X:.  a-  Eaj  X €.:.}
4
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The desirab.le  property.  of  course  is  that  the set  X.-  be
strictly convex.  A  thnd  this is  ac  hieved  i  f  t  he  set  X  +  is  stri  c•tl y
convex  and  the Hawk  ns--Si  mon  cond  i  t  i  ons  are sat  i  s i  ed.  )  We
basically  achieve convexity by  assuming  capital  stocks to be
fix  ed.  Further, the  degree of  conve:xity  is  to be  increased with
the number  of  fix.ed factors  of  production  in  each  firm,  since
this  implies  the well-celebrated  hypothesis  of:  diminishing
returns to scale  to the  variable factors.
In  contrast  to retaining  the neo-classical  properties  in  its
productio.n  technology, the  Model  recognizes two  ki:nds  of
imperfections  for  the portrayal  of  market  behavior.  The first
one  is  the ex.plicit  allowance  of  monopoly  power  in  certain
productiv  e  sectors;  the  other  is  the recognition  of  intersectoral
wage  differences for  the same category  of  labor.
Incorporation  of  mono(poly power into  CGE type  policy models
has  not  been  a  common  practice  (with  the  e.xception  of  Adelman &.
Robinson  1978 study).  Yet,  in  a  recent p)aper  Per  Lundb(:rg
provides evidence from the Malaysian tin  market showing  that  the
frequent procedur-e  of  assuming comp1etitive  markets may  lead  to
m:isleading  results  (see Lundborg,  1984).  Especial.ly,  when
analyzing  the distributional  effects of  different policy
packages,  existance  of  monopoly power  may  have  important
consequences which the  competitive markets cannot generate.  The
income flows arising from  the monopoly profits may be
substantial ,  and  may  further result  in  biased  innovations  (of  the
Binswanger  -..  Hayami  - Ruttan  type)  affecting the  i ntertemporal
grow':. t h I:)ath  (  of  the  ec  on omy.  <~
17Formally,  monopoly  power  is  introduced  into  the  Model  by  the
foll  ow:i ng  c:ondition:
xI:)  Upp  .-  :j.
MR.I.  - PNN.  (i  + I1/  ..  )  (11-8)
X  0
where  .i  is  the  elasticity  of  total  demand  for  commodity  i,  and
up.f:.  is  a  parameter  showing  the  rate  at  which  the  potential
monopoly  power  is  actually  utilized.  For  up.  - 1I  we  have  the
pure  monopoly  case.  If  up.f  =  0  we  return  to  the  competitive
configuration.  The  utilization  parameter,  up÷.,  may  be
interpreted  as  narrating  the  situation  of  a  monopolist  without
full  information  about  the  demand  curve  and/or  it  may  be
interpreted as  capturing  the institutional  and legal  constraints
faced  by  the enterprises.
The  issue  of  inter-sectoral  wage  differences  for  labor  of
the  same  skill  type,  on  the  other  hand,  has  been  tackled  in  most
of  the  CGE  Models  that  focus  on  income  distribution  analysis
(see,  for  example,  Adelman  &  Robinson  (1978);  de  Melo  &.  Robinson
(:980);  Lewis  &  Urata  (1983)).
In  fact,  evidence  on  inter-sectoral  wage-spread  is  abound,
yet  there  is  no  coherent  theoretical  explanation  for  this  fact.
Interestingly,  this  phenomenon  is  not  solely  an  attribute  of
developing  countries,  but  is  also  observed  in  the  developed
market  economies,  as  well.  For  example  Schuh  (1976)  argues  that
due to the  loss  of  positive externalities in  the  migration
process, the wage differentials  and  the associated  labor
migration from rural  U.S.-  South to urban  U.9S.--West  has been
continuing  for  over  100 years now,  yet  without  any prospects of
eqcuilibrium  being  achieved.
18The  method  -for incorporati  .ng  wage  differentials  has
conventi onal ly  been  to  assume  cronstants  of  propor ti  onal i ty
between  the  location  of  labor  and  the  economy-wide  average  wage
for  that  category  of  labor,  which  is  endogenously  determined  by
the  model  to  clear  the  labor  markets.  Our  Model,  also,  will
retain  this  method.  Thus,  denoting  the  wage  rate  for  labor  type
s,  employed  in  sector  i,  by  the  firm  -f,  with  Wf:Lt.s;  the  economy-
wide  average  wage  rate  for  labor  type  s  by  W,,..  and  letting  the
pr(op:ortionality  coef.ficient  be  \S:&.m  we  have:
Wfii.  3  =  .i1  W.  I  I-9)
Given  the  specified  production  technology  and  the  net  prices
from  equation  (II-4),  using  (I1-8)  and  (II-9)  one  can  derive  the
enterprise  demands  for  labor  of  each  skill  category  s.  The
private  enterprise's  demand  for  labor  of  the  skill  type  s  is
given  by  the  first  order  conditions  of  profit  maximization:
F'N,::),  ±  X p,  /  .... p i. ,  Wp  :, . (  -1  0  )
If  one  assumes  a  Cobb-Douglas  formulation  for  the  labor
aggregation  function  in  (11--7),  using  the  two  level  Cobb--.Douglas
technology,  equation  (II-10-)  takes  the  following  form:
L,.  =  (1/Wp  :  )  [  ( 1-  )  . ),:L  3  MRF:,  XSr.:,  (I  -11)
where  >\,,,,  is  the  labor  aggregation  elasticity  with  respect  to
sl.::ill  type  s  and  XS,..  (pr-of it.-max:  imizing  o.utput.i  supply  of  the
private  firm)  is  given  by:  (II-12)
19_-CL.  (  -c  pL, )  I  -3  . .' )  (  -L  ,  ) >p 1 a  1 /  Lp, AL
X  S,:.  =  A,.  Kp,,.  MR,  N  . II  ( 1  - -a.,  ) >~:,  /  Wp  3  3
The  public:  enterprise,  on  the  other  hand,  suffers  from
government  intervention  in  its  labor-hire  decisions,  and  from
inefficient  management  associated  with  the  "politicization"  of
incentives.
In  particular,  public  enterprise's  labor-demand  function  is
distorted  by  an  interference  factor,  INT±  (0  <  INT'  1);  and
is  given  by:
Lai-  . n  =  (1/INTsWj.)  [  (l-(1  . )  >,.i  3  MR,  '.XSj.i  (II-13)
Note  that,  as  the  intensity  of  government  interference  increases,
the  value  of  INTL  has  to  be  reduced.  Note  also  that  when
INTj  =  1, there  is  no  government  interference  and  the  public  firm
is  able  to  maximize  its  profits  just  like  the  private  firm.
Due  to  the  alleged  interference  and  inefficient  management,
the  public  firm  is  run  at  sub-optimal  capacity.  The  rate  of
capacity-utilization  in  the  public  firm  is  explicitly  modelled  as
follows:
bmc±  (LXi  )
Qi  =  INT.  (11-14)
where  Q,  is  the  public  enterprise  capacity-utilization  rate  in
sector  i;  bmc±i:Oi  is  the  coefficient  of  "bad  management";  and
LXi  is  the  sectoral  labor-output  ratio  for  the  public  firm.
Note  that  since  O  <  INT±  :*i I;  bmc±i  i:  0  and  LXi.  >  0,  we  have
0  :  Qi  :i  1i.
Again,  using  a  Cobb-Douglas  formulation  for  the  labor
20aggregation  afunction  (11-7)  along  with  the  two-level  Cobb-Douglas
produc:t:tion  te-chnology,  an  explicit  ex.pression  can  be  derived  f)or
the  pu.bl. ic  f  i  irm's  labor -output  rat:i.  :
LX  =,.  =  L=..  /XS.  (I1-15)
rn  X.  i'
is  "um  J
rn  Xr  <  I
=  (IlS,.1  1  ]  [  1 /  1 NT  I  M  Ri,  'WI,.,)  >s  , .- ,,)  i
r  s  i  n c  E  x since  •  c  >,j.  =  i.
Sectoral  output  supply  of  the  public  enterprise  is  given  by:
(11-16)
a_  0.,  ( 1 - a., :,  )  . (  1 - a.,  ± )
XS  *A,  K,:  MR  ,.  N.  .i
( 1- .,ýj  ) )\3 .1.  ,.  1/  (,..k
L  [  ( 1 -a.c,  i. )  -:,.i  >  /  (  I NT'.  '  W: :  ,.)  ]3
tun
Total  output  in  sector  i  then  becomes:
XS,.  =  XS,.  +  XS,  (I  -17)
Given  labor  demands  in  each  sector,  total  labor  demand  for
each  skill  category  s  can  be  calculated.  Thus,
DL,  =  E  (Lp  ,  +  L.i,.)  (11-18)
i
In  Stage  I,  l.abor  supplies  by  skill  type  are  assumed  to  be
fixed  at  SLi,,:.  These,  however,  wi:ll.  be  endogenized  by  assuming  a
natural  growth  rate  for  l.abor  and  recoglnizing  the  possibi.lity  o.f
21migratiU.on  from agricultural  to urban  sectors  in  the  second,
dynamic stage of  the  CGE Model.
Given  *fixed  labor supplies  for each  skill  category, the
market  clearing  nominal  wage  rate,  W.,  can  be  found via  iteration
on
DL  S  - SL  =  O  (11-19)
Note that,  for certain  skill categories  the  nominal  wage
rate can  be  taken as given  or  having  a  lower  bound, reflecting,
for  instance,  government's policies  on  minimum wages.  The'n  W.fi,
becomes a fixed  variable and the  level  of  employment  is
determined by the  level  of  demand.
The model  can  further  be  enriched by  specifying monopolistic
factor  markets reflecting  labor  unions' power  and so  on.  The
flow of  the  core model,  however,  will  remain  the same.
Having  derived  the wage  bill,  the profits of  the  enterprises
can  easily be  calculated as  residuals in  the sectoral  value added,
Thus,  the private enterprise profits become:
RPF'  =  PF'Nr,  XSp:,i  - E  WpA  ,,,:,L  LF  )  ,,J  (II  -2"0)
and the public  enterprise profits  (losses if  negative) are:
R  C3.  PNg±  '  XSj.  Ez  (11-21 (II-21)FOREIGN  TRADE
Now  we  can  construc:t  the  trade  equations  of  our  model.  On
the  import  side,  recall  that  we  have  specifi ed  the  buyer's
problem  as  one  of  cost  minimization,  where  the  relevant  "cost
function"  was  one  of  a  CES  formulation  used  to  "p3roduce"  a
composite  commodity,  CC.,  with  imported  good,  M:,.  and  the
domestic:  good,  IDC.  ,  taken  as  "inputs".
In  Economics  jargon,  the  buyer's  problem  is  simply  to  find
the  import-domestic  demand  ratio  which  satisfies  the  condition
that  the  marginal  rate  of  substitution  between  Mi  and  DC.  be
equal  to  their  respective  price  ratios.
For  convenience,  I  repeat  here  the  composite  commodity
function  (II  -1)
- I.  - ::.  -"1/p
CCI,. :=  B.:L  .I:  M..  +  (  - E.  ) DC  (II  - 1)
The  Lagrangean  of  the  buyer's  problem  is:
S  =  PMi.  MI  . +  PD.  *  DCi  +  > LCC  B  - Bi  ( 8M-  .
-'.:.  - 1 /  :'
+  (l-&:L)  DC±  )  ]  (11-22)
where  CCi is  a  pre-specified  level  of  "output"  of  CC:.  The  first
order  conditions  of  this  problem  yield:
m i  M/./DCt  =  (PD.i/PM.t  )  (  1/  1-  .. )  (II-23)
Recall  that  .'i  =  1/l+p:.'.,  is  the  elasticity  of  substitution.
Import  demand  for  commodity  i  can  be  found  easily  from  (II-23):Mi.  =  (PD.i/PMi.)  (C/l-  . )  DC,.  (II-24)
However,  at  this  point  DC,  is  not  yet  known.  It  needs  to  be
calculated  and  be  fed  into  (II-24).  Yet,  without  knowing  the
import-quantities  domestic  production/consumption  decisions
cannot  be  realized  and  there  is  no  way  of  solving  for  both  DC±
and  M±  simultaneously.  A  simple  trick  solves  the  problem,
however,  by  using  the  identity  that  domestic  supply  for  domestic
market,  DS.,  is  given  by  total  domestic  supply  minus  exports.  We
get,
DS. =  XSi  - E,  (II-25)
Further,  in  product  market  equilibrium  we  must  have
DCs  =  DSi  (11-26)
Hence,  using  (11-26)  we  can  derive  the  import  demand  for
commodity  i  as:
Mi  =  (PD'  /PMi )  (  /l-i)  DS,.  (11-27)
which  is  a  workable  relation for  the  Model.
On  the  export  side,  we  first  need  to  formulate  the  export
price  for  each  commodity.  Similar  to  the  treatment  of  import
prices  as  in  equation  (11-3),  the  export  price  relations  can  be
formulated  as  follows:
PEj.  =  PWE±  *  (1  +  SE±.)ER  (II--28)
where  PEI.  is  the  domestic  currency  receipts  per  unit  exported
from  sector  i;  SE.  is  the  rate  of  export  subsidy  for  the  product
24of  sector  i.;  and  PWE:,.  is the -fixed  world  price  in  foreign
C  U.  r r  e  n  r  i  ,,
Further, there are  certain  behavioral  constraints that  we
have to  impose on  (11-28) to guarantee meaningful  results  in  the
rest  of  our  model.  Note that  if  PE.,.  happens  to be  greater  than
FPD  ,  the domestic  price  of  commodity i,  then  the  Model  will
instruct  the productive enterprises to  export all  of  the domestic
output  leaving  nothing  for  domestic  consumption.  Such  a
situation  should, of  course exert  upward  pressure on  PD.. until
both prices  are equalized.  Thus,  although there  is  the  logical
possibility  that  PE:.  > PDi. and  that  all  domestic demand  for
commodity  i  mgight  b:e  satisified  through  imports,  whhil.e  all  that  is
d omest  i cal  y  produced  be  i n  g sol  d abroad, we  will  rule  out.  t  hi s
extreme behavior by  recognizing the  following constraints on  the
ex:port  side.
PD.  !:  PE.i.  such  that
if  PD.,  - PE.  , E  !:  0
if  PD>  PEi ,  Ei  = 0
Yet,  another  problem is  the very hypothesis we  have invoked
about the treatment  of  tradeables  in  general.  Accordingly, we
distinguish products by  country of  origin  and  hence, there  is  the
possibility  that the export  demand  functions .for  the home
country's products may be  less than  infinitely elastic.
The export  demand functions for  our country's products must
then  be  in  the form:
E.  E.  (AWPF  ,  PWEI)where  AWPi  is an  "aggregated"  world price  for  products  in  the
s ector  i  's out!:put  category which,  as  well  reflects a  wei..ghted.
aver.age  of  all  production  costs  and  trade  policies  of  all
countries.
In  designing  the  specific form  of  the  export  demand  function
E.(  ),  we  will  retain  the  small  country  assumption  in  the
special  sense  that  AWP  will  be  treated  as  fixed  and given.
However,  PWE:L  now  becomes  an  endogenous  price,  determined  by  the
domestic  production  costs,  export  policy  as  reflected  in  sectoral
subsidy  rates  and  the  exchange  rate:
PWE,  =  PD./[ (l+SE.  )ER3  (II-29)
From  (II-29)  we  can  easily  deduce  that  an  increase  in  our
production  costs  will  increase  PDI  and  raise  the  price  of  our
exportables  as  we  present  them  into  the  world  market.  Also  an
increase  in  the  export  subsidy  rate  or  a  devaluation  (an  increase
of  ER)  leads  to  a  fall  in  FWE  . In  the  latter  case,  if  AWF'.  were
to  remain  constant  there  will  be  an  increase  for  our  country's
export  demand  for  product  i  and  hence,  an  increase  in  our  world
market  share.
Following  Dervis  and  Robinson  (1978)  and  also  Dervis  et.  al.
(1982)  one  can  make  the  assumption  that  the  world  consumers  as  a
whole  behave  according  to  the  rules  of  cost  minimization  with  a
generalized  CES  function  specifying  the  world commodities as  a
composite  good.  We  can  then  specify  the  export  demand  functions
in  the  single  elasticity  form:
26E . =  E.,  (AW ./  PF'WE  )  (  I -30)
where ':(.  is the  elasticity  of  export  demand and  EJ.i.  is the  normal
trend level  of  the home  country exports  when  AWP:I.  PWE,.
Having  thus constructed the export  demand  equations, what  is
left  for  us  is  to find  an  endogenous expression for  the  export
subsidy  rate, SE,..  Many governments,  instead of  granting a
single ad  valorem subsidy rate to ex  porters, provide a comp:lex
set  of  incentives for producers to encourage the  ex.portation  of
their products.  These  incentives  may range  from beggar-thy-
neighbor  mercantilist policies, to  a  laissez--faire  treatment on•
tradables.  In  this paper,  a policy  pacl.kage  consisting  of  four
different  ex.port  incentive schemes  is recognized  and explicitly
modelled  These are:  (1) rebates on  pr.).oduction  taxes,  tn.:  ,  son
the  products destined  for  exports;  (2)  allowance  on  the  corporate
income tax  at  a certain percentage  rate of  export  earnings;  (3)
permission  of  .duty  free intermediate 'imports  used  for  the
production of  exports;. and  (4)  a  sectorally di.fferentiated  ad
valorem export  subsidy  (tax  if  negative)  rate which  is  directly
paid  out  of  the  government budget.
It  w:i.ll  further  be  assumed  in the  Model  that  the government
sets sectorally differentiated  "eligibility criteria"  on  ex.ports
that  may  benefit from  the above  schemes,  such as  exports destined
for  designated world markets, or  export  earnings exceeding some
minimum value  in  foreign currency, etc.  Depending on  the
st.  r  i ctness of  these cond  i t i ons  it  will  b  e assumed  that  the
eli  gi bility rate for  exports  in  the  pr'od.ucti  on  tax  r'ebate  and
allowance on  corporate income  tax  schemes is  historically around
27ee. percent  of  total  exports.  For  the  remaining  two  schemes  ee
is  taken  to  be  100.O
Therefore,  under  the  first  scheme  total  subsidy  granted  to
sector  i  will  be:
TSR±  =  tn:.  * ee:L  * FPWE  * ER  * EE  (II-31)
which  corresponds  to  subsidy  equivalent  of  tn.  *  ee±  percent..
Under  the  corporate  income  tax  allowance  scheme,  total  income  tax
allowance  granted  is:
TKA  =  kta  * Eee  * PFWEi  *  ER  ,  E,  (II-32)
where  kta  is  the  granted  corporate  income  tax  allowance  rate.
Letting  tk  denote  the  capitalist  (corporate)  income  tax  rate,
total  subsidy  on  exports  due  to  this  scheme  is:
TSA:.  =  tk  kta  * eel  PWE.  * ER  * E.  (II-33)
which  corresponds  to  an  ad  valorem  subsidy  of  tk  ,  kta  ee.
percent.
As  for  the  third  scheme,  observe  that  the  domestic  currency
value  of  imported  intermediate  inputs  used  for export  production
is:
EMI.  =  EPWMj  * ER  * dj  ,  mj  * a.:  E±  (II-34)
J
where d.  is  the domestic  use ratio  of  the j-th composite good
(see equation  11-57 below);  and  mnj  is  the  import-domestic good
ratio introduced  in  equation  II-23  above.  Thus d  * mj  *  'a
gives the amount  of  imported  intermediate good  j, per  unit  of
good  i produced and  exported.
28Total  import  tax  to  be  paid  on  such  imports  then  becomes:
T"EMI'  =T Etmj.  , P  WM.. 1  ,  ER  R  dj  ,  m.J  a...j  Ei  (II--3  )
which  gives  rise  to  an  ad  valorem  subsidy  rate  of
Etm.j* FWM  *dj  mj  aji  * (1/PWE.  )  per  unit  of  exports.
-i
Combining  with  an  explicit  sectoral  subsidy/tax  rate  of  te.
on  exports,  the  realized  overall  export  subsidy  rate  becomes:
SE:i.  =-  (tn . +  tk  *  kta)  ee,.  (II-36)
+  Etm.j  *  PWMI.  d..  m  ..  a.j. 2   (I/PWE:  )  +  te,.
J
which  appears  in  PWEi in  equation  (11-29).  Note  that  since  the
above  expression  further  entails  PWE.  ,  it  needs  to  be
solved  by  numerical  methods.
Balance  of  Payments  EquIilibrium  is  then  achieved  when,
EPWM  *  M:.  - EF'WE:,.  E.  F-  F  - WR  C  0  (I1-37)
±  .
where  F  and  WR  starnd  for  the  ex:ogenous  value  of  the  net  foreign
resource  inflow  and  workers'  remittances,  respectively.  If  the
exchange  rate  is  allowed  to  adjust  freely  (which  is  as  well  a
policy  decision,  hence  we  continue  to  use  a  circumflex .  on  ER),  ER
will  need  to  be  iterated  until  (I1-37)  is  satisfied.  Per  contra,
if  the  government  chooses  to  fix  ER  at  some  value,  there  is  no
guarantee  that  Balance  of  Payments  Equilibrium  would  be  satisfied
(a  surprise  to  no  one!);  hence,  the  government  would  need  either
to  ration  imports  or  try  to  increase  exports,  or  get  more  foreign
resources.  Such  commercial  policy  analyses  using  CGE  Models  are
abound  and  the  interested  reader  may  wish  to  consult  with  the
works  cited  :i.n  the  References  to  this  paper.
29INCOMES  GENERATION,  CONSUMER  DEMANDS  AND  SAVINGS
The  functional  incomes  of  different  consumer  groups  of  the
Model  are  generated  using  the  results  derived  in  the  factor
markets  and  the  derivations  are  quite  straight  forward.
For  labor- skill-type  s,  assuming  that  the  tax  rate  is  ts
total  disposable  income  can  be  written  as:
YL.  =  (1-ts)  E  (WI  ',Lp,.  +  W  S..Lg.±.)  +  ) 4 *WR'ER  (II-38)
where  w  is  the  share  of  workers'  remittances  captured  by  labor
group  s.
Capitalists'  disposable  income  becomes:
YK  =:  (l-tk)  ERP,  (I  1-39)
Fublic  enterprises'  aggregate  after-tax  income  is:
YK3  =  (1-tk)  ERG.  (II-40)
Government's  total  income  is:
(II-41)
YG  =  Ets  E(WpisLpi,  +  W,.iL,,,)
+  tk  E(RF'.  +  RG±  - kta'eei*PWE. sEREi±)
+  ECtm  ,*PWM.t  ER,'M-EtmAjPWM.,  ERd-j *mj  a. 1,E±3
+  Etni :F'PDXSI-ee:  '*PWE±  'EREi]  - Yte  *PFWEi  *ER  E,
. sn
- 1  [sn±  ,PD'D.  ,XSp,.  +  sn<.i  ,PD±  *XSc±  ]  +  YKG  +  FERGiven  total  incomes  for  different  socio-economic  groups,  our
next  task  then,  is  to  cal culate  the  components  of  domestic  demand
for each  sector.
In  the  absence  of  money  markets  and  any  specification  of
lending  behavior,  the  investment  demand  is  totally  savings-
determined.  Hence,  the  savings-pool  of  the  economy  sets  the
limits  of  the  investment  demand,  and  capital  formation  in
general.  The  model  distinguishes  between  private  and  public
savi ngs/cnsumpt i on  behavi or .  Private  agents  are  assumed  to  save
a  fraction  of  their  disposable  incomes,  given  corresponding
savings  parameters.  The  government  on  the  other  hand,  is  assumed
to  set  an  exogenous  policy  on  the  required  public  investments  as
a  proportion  of  total  GDFP  and  given  this  exogenous  policy  ratio,
it  withdraws  the  necessary  fraction  of  its  total  income  as
savings.
In  particular,  total  private  savings,  TPS  is  the  sum  of  the
savings  of  all  workers  of  skill  types  and  capitalists:
TPS  =  ES, YL..  ..  +  sk  YK  (II-42)
where  S.  and  sk  are  saving  rates  out  of  labor  income  of  skill--
type  s  and  capitalist  income,  respectively.
The  government  is  assumed  first  to  establish  a  policy  on  the
ratio  of  total  public  investment  to  gross  domestic  product.
Denoting  this  policy  ratio  by  8,  the  necessary  investment  fund
of  the  government,  GIF,  can  be  found:
IF  "= 9  (  L-PD:  XS..  - YE  PC j  a.  XSi)  (II-43)
wi  ;i.  J
where  the  expression  in  parantheses  gives  the  nominal  grossdomestic  product  of  the  economy.  Having  stated  GIF,  the  required
savings  rate  for  the  government  is  given  by:
Sg  =  GIF/YG  (11-44)
Once  the  saving  decisions  are  made,  what  is  left  for  the
transactors  is  to  determine  the  consumption  demands  for  each
product.  The  private  and  public  consumption  functions  will  again
be  distinguished,  reflecting  the  state  of  affairs  that  private
consumers'  demand  functions  are  derived  by  way  of  preference
maximization,  but  the  government's  decision  are  exogenous  in
nature.  One  can,  of  course,  specify  a  preference  map  for  the
government  bureaucrats  as  well  and  derive  government's  demand
functions  from  that  map.  This,  however,  would  be  a  very
complicated task  involving heuristic assumptions, and  requiring
very  specialized  data  sets  which  would,  most  probably,  be  beyond
reach  for most  of  the developing  countries.
The  private  consumption demand  function will  be  given  by  a
linear expenditure system  (LES)  of  the following  form:
For  labor-skill  s:
C  L.  '.  t  =  T.+  / F'P:C  ( 1 -S.)YL.-EPC.F  j3  (11-45)
where  r.i  is  some  absolute  minimum  (subsistence)  level  of
consumption  of  commodity  i  for  group  s.  The  expression  in  the
parantheses  gives  the  total  income  in  excess  of  the  expenditures
over  the  subsistence-basket.  The  parameter  ,,,,  is  the  margiDina•l.
budget  share  of  product  i,  and  it  tells  how  consumer  group  s
allocates  its  marginal  income  above  the  subsistence  level  across
32sectors.  The  derivation  of  the  LES  and  its  properties  are
fur ther'  e x am i ned  i  n  Appendix.  A.
Th e  cap  :  tal.  i st  consumpt ion  demalnds  al so  f oil  lw  the  same
f or mat,
CK  T  ,..:.  +  ,:  /F  PC:i.  : (1-sk)  YK  - EPC-  ,. j  (11-46)
The  government  consumptian  demand  will  be  assumed  to  be  of
the  following  simple  form -
CG:,.  q:·  (1-Sg)  YG/PC  ( 11-47)
where  q.  is  the  policy-induced  public  expenditure  share  for  the
product  of  sector  i.
The  total  consumption  demand  for  product  i  then,  can  be
found  as  the  sum  of  private  and  public  consumption  demands,
C:1. =  L  CL,.  +  CK.  +  CG.(  (11-48)
To  construct  investment  demands,  recall  that  we  assume  total
investment  demand  to  be  constrained  by  total  savings  generated  in
the  economy.  The  Model  determines  sectoral  private  investments
thro..ugh  e.xogenous  investment  allocation  coefficients,  Hl:..  These
coefficients  are  then  endogenized  in  the  Stage  II  Model  by  using
previous  period's  prices,  production  costs  and  pro.fit  rates.
Real  private  investment  in  sector  i  is:
NPF.  =  H:i.  ("I"TPS/FPK  )  (  1-49)
where  FPK  is  the  price  of  capital..  Si nce  capital  is  a  fixed-
coeffic:i.  ents  composite  commodity  its  price  is  given  by  a  wei.ghted
33average  of  its  components:
PK.  Eb  .. j  PCj  (I  --50)
.J
Real  public  investment  in  sector  i  is  found  in  analogous
manner,  yet  here  sectoral  allocation  coefficients,  HG3,  are  truly
exogenous  (i.e.  not  endogenized  in  the  Stage  2  Model,  but  only
up-dated).  This  treatment  reflects  government's  sectoral
priorities  for  investment.  Thus,
NG.  =  HG:L  (G IF/PK  )  (II  -51)
total  real  investment  to  sector  i  is  then:
NT:L  =  NPi  +  NGB:  (I1-52)
Now,  note  that  NT±  gives  the  amount  of  real  investment  to.
the  i-th  sector.  Yet,  for  national  income  accounting  purposes  we
need  to  know  the  amount  of  investment  demand  from  sector  i.  In
Planning  Literature,  the  former  is  referred. as  "investment  by
sector  of  destination",  and  the  latter  as  "investment  by  sector
of  origin".
Therefore, to  get real  investment demands by sector  of
origin,  Z.,  we  use the capital  composition coefficients once
again and  arrive:
Zi  =  Eb.  (N'T.)  (II-53)
j
The  last  component  of  total  demand  is  the  demand  for
intermediate  inputs  and  can  be  calculated  easily  using  the  input-
output  coefficients.  Letting  Vi  denote  the  amount  of
34intermediate  demand  from  sector  i,
V . Eaa  . XSJ  (I-54)
The  total  demand  for  commodity  i,  TD.,  is  then:
TDi  =  Cs  +  Z.L  +  V:L  (II-55)
Now,  since  we  have  found  the  magnitude  of  total  demand  f:-)r
each  composite  p:roduct  our  final  task  is  to  decompose  this
magnitude  into  its  two  components:  domestic  and  foreign.  TDI:.  of
equation  (II-55)  gives  total  demand  -for the  overall  composite
good,  as  was  defined  in  (II-I).  In  the  meantime  we  have  derived
domestic  output  supp:lies  and  in  order  to  -find the  market  clearing
domestic  prices  (PD:  's)  we  need  domestic  demands  as  well.
Important  as  it  is,  this  is  not  a  complic-ated  task,  especially
when  we  use  certain  mathematical  properties  of  the  CES  function
which  deffines  the  compos:i.te  good  in  (II-1).  It  can  easily  be
shown  that  the  CES  function  in  (II-1)  is  linearly  homogenous  in
its  variables,  Mi  and  DC:.,  and  can  be  re-written  as:
CC.  C  =  f  . (m.  )  ,  I.1) DC..  (1:  -56)
where  f .1.  )  specifies  the  CES  function  given  in  (II-I)  We  then
have:
d,.  =  DCI/CC:.  =  fi  (mi,l)  (II-57)
Since  mi  is  a  function  of  the  relative  price  ratio  PDi./PM.
(see  equation  II11-23),  d  is  uniquely  determined  by  FPDI:./PFM  as
well.  It  must  be  noted,  however,  that  the  demand  for  thecomposite  commodity,  CC.,  depends  on  all  of  the relative  prices.
We  can  use  di  and  go  from  composite  commodity  demand  to  the
domestic  demand  for  the  domestically  produced  commodity,
DC.  =  di  * TD:  (II-58)
Adding  export  demand  of  foreign  consumers  to  domestic
demand,  we  get  the  total  demand  for  domestic  product  i:
XD  =  DCi  +  E:L  (11-59)
Market-clearing  conditions  imply  that  all  excess  demands  be  zero,
XD.  - XS6.  =  0  (I1-60)
The  solution  strategy  of  our  static  CGE  Model  then  starts
with an  initial  guess  of  domestic prices, PDi,  the wage  rates,
W,,,,  and  the  exchange  rate  ER.  We  first  calculate  the  excess
labor  demand  in  factor  markets  and  revise  wages  until  these
markets  are  cleared.  Then,  using  the  labor  aggregation  and
production  functions  we  calculate  sectoral  output  supplies.  In
the meantime,  from wage and profit  incomes,  labor  and capitalist
incomes  are  generated;  while  government's  total  income  is  given
by  the tax  revenues, public  enterprises'  sectoral  profits  and  net
foreign  resource inflows.  From incomes generated, savings  and
consumption  decisions are  carried  out  and  the  savings-pool  is
turned  into sectoral  investment  demands by the  sectoral  investment-
allocation  parameters  and  capital.--composi ti  on  coefficients.
Import  and  export  demands  are  derived  as  a  function  of  domestic
and  world  prices,  tariff/subsidy  rates  and  the  exchange  rate.
36Once  product  e.cess  demands  and  the  Balance  of  Payments  equati on
are  d eter m i  rn  ed,  t he  i n  i t i a l  g u ess  o  f  r.:d  omesti  . c:: pri c:es  and  the
exchange  rate  are  revised  so  as  to  satisfy  the  condition  that
they  will  be  suffici  ent  y  close  toW zer(".  "'  With  the  new  set  of
domestic  prices  and  the  exchange  rate  the  Model  is  solved  once
again  and  this  process  continues  until  convergence  is  achieved,
As  we  have  discussed  previously,  however,  we  know  that  the
Model  obeys  the  Wallras'  Law  that  the  value  cof  all  ex.cess  demands
add  up  to  zero.  This  means  that  if  I'PD  =  {PD  I  ,  . ...  , I'D,·,  is  a
set  of  soluti  on  prices  so  is  t  F'PD"  for  any  scalar  t>0  ;  and  it
is  the  Planner's  job  to  specify  a  normalization  rule  to  set  the
relative  price  system  for  the  Model.  I  have  adopted  a  "no--
inflation"  procedure  and  chose  to  normalize  the  price  system
around  a  gi ven  index  P:
EPC.  Q•  =  (II-61)
where  S"Qi.  are  the  weights  defining  the  index  PF
Equation  (-61)  closes  the  system  of  eati(--)  cse  te  stem  tions  of  Stage  1.
A  sketch  of  an  ex.istance  proof  for  the  core  model  is  presented  in
Dervis  et.  al . (1982)  and  the  interested  reader  can  get  an
intuitive  n-otion  of  the  general  equilibrium  properties  of  the
Model  from  the  analysis  presented  there.  "iihe  stability
properties  of  the  Model  are  actually  implied  in  the  solution
algorithm  used  for  the  iteration  of  prices  to  clear  the  excess
demand  equations  in  (II-60).  Thus,  practically  what  is  left  for
us  i s  to:  go  on  to  t he  Stage  2  Model  and  upda'te  anid/or"  endogen ize
t he  e;xogenous  variables  of  the  static  St.age  1  Model  equati  ons.
37III  - THE OPEN CGE MODEL:  STAGE - 2
As  stated  earlier,  the  task  of  the  Stage  2  Model  is  to  up-
date  and  endogenize  the  fixed  variables  of  the  first  stage.
Here,  some  of  the  variables  may  need  to  be  up-dated  using  certain
regression/trend-line  modelling;  while  certain  others  may  warrant
some  behavioral  model  specification.  9"'  For  those  variables  of
the  former  type,  the  "aging  technique"  is  left  to  the  planner..
Thlis  may  be  accomplished  using  simple  trend-line  equations,
forecasting  methods,  etc.  Adelman  and  Robinson  (1978),  for
example,  provides  an  inspiring  tabulation  of  such  exercises,  and
the  interested  reader  may  wish  to  consult  with  their  methods  on
revising  the  exogenous  variables  of  the  Stage  1  Model.
In  this  section,  two  variables  are  selected  and  modelled
using  behavioral  equations,  just  to  give  an  example  on  such
modelling.  The  variables  are:  labor  supplies;  SL,  (equation
reference,  11-19)  and  private  investment  allocation  parameters,
H 1. (equation  reference,  11-49)  though,  of  course,  this  selection
is  by  no  means  decisive  for  all  types  of  constructs.  The
behavioral  models  are  taken  from  Dervis  and  Robinson  (1978)  and
Dervis  et.  al.  (1982).  Lewis  and  Urata  (1983),  also  used  them
with  some  minor  changes  in  their  planning  exercises  on  Turkey,
for  the  period  1978-1990.
LABOR  SUPPLIES  AND  RURAL-URBAN  MIGRATION
Labor  supplies  of  different  skill  categories  are  endogenized
through  exogenously  specified  natural  rates  of  population  growth
and  endogenous  migration  from  rural  to  urban  sectors.  Assumingth  a t  ri..l..:tura  1.  ab or  is  d :i st i ngu  shed  by  ski : 1  type- 1  and
tha  t  a:  l  other  ski ll  types,  s=2 ,...,  ,  corr'espond  to  di4fferent
(categoriet  s  o f :urban.  .abor,  we  have  the  fol  owin g  s ystem  o.f :abor
supply  equations:
SL.  (t+1)  =  (l+r  )  SL.(t)  - MIG(t)  (III-i)
SL..(t+l)  =  (l+r  )  SL  (t)  +  (SM.)  MIG(t)  (III-2)
s  =  2,  ..,m
where  1,  (s=,...,m)  is  the  ex.ogenously  specified  natural  .growth
rate  of  the  labor  force  - type  s;  SMl.  is  the  share  of
agricultural  labor  that  joins  the  ranks  of  the  urban  labor  force
type-s  (plausibly  SM,.,  will  get  a  smaller  numerical  value  as  one
goes  higher  in  the  skill  levels  di st ingui shed  for  the  urban
sector).  MIG(t)  is  the  number  of  agricultural  workers  leaving
their  occupations  and  joining  to  the  ranks  of  urban  labor  force.
Following  Harris  and  Todaro  (1970),  migrati on  is  seen  as  a
f unt ction  of  the  di fferences  between  the  rutral.  and  expected  u.rban
wages.  In  particular,
MIG(t)  =  ...  L (EW,.  - W,.)/W  .]  SLi (t)  (III-3)
where  vg  is  a  parameter  measuring  the  responsiveness  of  migration
to  the  differential  between  agricultural  and  anticipated  urban
wages;  and  EW....  is  the  expected  urban  wage,  which  can  be
formulated  in  the  following  simple  fashion:
EWu  ....  E  E  C:  Wr.,i..  (t)*  L  .±,  (t)  +  W•.:i.t„(t)  '*  ..  (t)  3  1/L.. (t)
w  I-h .L  m-t  it  (I  II-4e)
where  L,..,(t)  is  the  total  urban  labor  force  (note  s=,...,m).
39SECTORAL  ALLOCATION  OF  PRIVATE  INVESTMENT
Private  investment  behavior  is  one  of  the  hardest  aspects  of
applied  planning  exercises.  Theoretically,  private  investment
demand  is  affected  by  a  whole  set  of  variables,  such  as  expected
sales;  past,  present  and  expected  future  profits;  profit  rate
differentials  across  sectors,  as  well  as  by  the availability of
the  investment  funds.  In  the  previous  applications  of  CGE
Models,  one  of  the  most  elaborate  formulations  of  private
investment  behavior  has  been  used  by  Adelman  and  Robinson  (1978).
In  their  model,  investment  demand  and  supply  of  loanable-funds
decisions  are  carried  out  by  different  sets  of  agents.  Through  a
simple  model  of  expectations,  enterprises  form  their  investment
demand  decisions  and  demand  funds  from  the  loanable-funds  market.
Further,  supply  of  funds  come  from  various  sources  such  as
organized  banks  and  the  unorganized,  curb  market.
General  and  realistic  as  it  is,  the  data  base  and  effort
required  for  such  a  construction  is  really  tremendous  and  makes
it  very  difficult  to  be  applicable  in  development  policy
analysis.  For  this  reason,  I  will  resort  to  a  less  ambitious
construction,  one  that  has  been  used  and  tested  successfully  in
the  applied  experiments  of  Dervis  and  Robinson  (1978)  and  Lewis
and  Urata  (1983).
In  the  Model  used  here,  investment  shares  are  seen  as  a
function  of  the  relative  profit  rate  of  each  sector  compared  to
the  average  profit  rate  as  a  whole.  Sectors  that  have  higher
than  average  profit  rates,  then  capture  a  larger  portion  of  the
private  savings-pool.  According  to  this  formulation,  investment
40shares  are  given  by:
Hi  (t+1)  = SR1  . (t)  +  e  SR:.  (t)  E11.j.  (t)-rr(t)  :]/IT(t)  (III-5)
where:  SR.  (t)  :  RF'P:  (t)/ERPF'  (t)  ,  is  the  sectoral  share  in
i.
aggregate  private  profits;  e  is  a  parameter  measuring  the
mobility  of  investment  funds;  ir.  (t)  is  the  sectoral  profit  r.ate
and  Tr(t)  is  the  average  profit  rate.
Private  enterprise  profit  rates  are  formulated  as  follows:
+':PK.  (t)  - FPK  (t-1)  * (l-dp.  ) J/PK:.  (t-1)  ( 111  6)
where  dpi.  is  the  fixed  sectoral  depreciation  rate  of  the
private  physical  capital  stock,  and  Kp  (t-1)  is  the  amount  of
capital  stock:  bought  at  the  end  of  the  last  period  and  used  in
the  product ion  in  the  current  per i od
The  crucial  point  i  n  the  f ormulIat i on  of  i nvestment
al Iocat i on  coef ficients  is  to  guaraantee  that  they  add  up  to  1.
This  is  achieved  by  expressing  the  private  enterprise  average
profit  rate  as  the  sum  of  the  sectoral  private  profit  rates
weighted  by  their  shares  in  total  private  profits.  Thus,
Tr(t)  =  E  .(t )  (  SR:.  (t)  (I I-7)
i
Since  ESR,  (t)  =  1,  then  it  is  true  that  for  any  value  of  e,
ESRI  : TI - T 3/
i.
=  C  RPF,. /  ERFP.  ( (  rr  ERF'P.  - ETrr  . RPF.  ) / Err i RP . ) 3
=  (  ETr ..  RP  ERF'  -"  ERPF  i E'rr :.  IRP.,  ) / ERP  :.  Err  RPi  =  0
41What  remains  is  to  up-date  the  sectoral  capital  stocks  of
the  enterprises.  Here,  for  the  purposes  of  realism,  one  can
specify  gestation  lags  for  installation  of  the  capital  stocks.
Thus,  the  capital  stock  that  will  be  used  in  the  next  production
period  will  be  expanded  by  the  investments  of  the  previous  years
finished  after  a  certain  lagged  period  of  time.  Accordingly,
private  enterprises'  stocks  of  physical  capital  which  will  be
used  in  the  next  period's  production  process  will  be  given  by:
Kpi  (t)=  Kpi (t-1).  (-dp.)  +  E  Ap,,±,  NF'P  (t-r)  (III-8)
where  Ri,..  is  the  proportion  of  capital  goods  bought  in  time  t-r
that  will  be  installed  to  the  private  firm  operating  in  sector
i,  by  the  end  of  the  current  period.  It  must  be  true  that
E  pA.r  =  1.  The  variable  T  is  the  longest  gestation  lag,
whereas  the  minimum  lag  can  be  set  at  one  year  by  letting
p  1. c:>  1.
Public  enterprises'  physical  capital  stocks  which  will  be
employed  in  the  next  period  will  likewise  be:
T
Kgi  (t)  gL (t)-l)  (1-dgL)  +  E  A ,.r  NG.  (t-r)  (III-9)
*r"  nm  ir.
This  completes  the  construction  of  our  Open  CGE  Model.  In
the  next  section  I  present  the  equations  of  the  Stage  1  Model  in
a  compact  form.  The  presentation  is  designed  so  as  to  encompass
a  variety  of  applied  problems;  yet  the  specific  modelling  effort
should,  of  course,  always  be  suited  to  the  special
characteristics  of  the  problem  at  hand.
42IV - EQUATIONS AND VARIABLES OF THE OPEN CGE MODEL - STAGE  1
In  this  sect ion  I  lay  down  the  core  equations  of  the  Stage  1
iMolel.  Tab  e  1. gives  the  equation  summary  on  pri ces,  Tabl e  2
gives  the  equati.  ons  of  factor  markets  and  product  supplies,  and
Table  3  presents  those  of  the  product  markets.
T'A B  I E  Pr ices
Composite  commodity
CC.  =  Bi8 C  .MS  I  ( 1--  )DC.  3
No.  of.




Composite  good  price
I'C  C.  (/B  1-  ~M  )
PC.  =  l/B,.c.  PMF  . +.  ( 1-c  )  1/)-  D:, +  ( :L-S  )  PD0±  ]
Price  of  the  imported  good  in  domestic  currency
F'PM:.  ==  'WM:  (l+tm  )  ER
Net  price  or  value  added  (f:=p,g)
1-  N-  =  PF'D  - CF'C .a  ..  - tni.FPD  +  sn  .PD  .
n  (11-50) Frice  of  capital
PK±  =  L  Eb  .,  PC..
Normali zati on
E'PC.  *  S.  =  P




(I  1-61),Endogenous  Vari ables
CC.,. Composite  good  n
FPC.  Composite  good  price  n
PM:.  Domestic  price  of  imports  n
PN÷j  Net  price  (value  added)  of  the  output  2n
of  firm  type  f.
PK±  Price  of  capital  n
Tota  :  6n
Exogenous  Variables  and  Parameters
p'  Composite  good  - CES  function  parameters
BE  Composite  good  - CES  function  scale  parameter
6.  Composite  good  - CES  function  share  parameter
a•.  Elasticity  of  substitution  between  import  and  domestic
demand  in  composite  good
PWMW  World  price  of  imports
tm.  Tariff  rate  on  imports
tn.  Indirect  tax  rate
sn.i  Production  subsidy  rate
aij  Input-output  coefficients
S1  Weights  of  the  price  index
P  Level  of  price  index
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N.u.mb.e.r.TIAB9LE  2:  Factor  Mark::ets  and  Product  Supplies
No.  of  Reference
.. e  ... _...&  . s....  ......  ...............  .n  ... ...........
P r o d uc t  i o n  f u n c t  i.  on s  ( f = p , g)  2n  ( 1  -6)
...  .. .:  .,.  ( 1 - .f  :, )
X  * :,.  ":::  A  ff:  . K  . L  •  I.
Labor  Aggregation  (f=pg)  2n  (I1-7)
L es.  =  L.f A (L.f  i..1.  L.fi,  :.  m)  =  N  I  i  :  L..f•r,
Demand  for  Intermediate  Inputs  n  (11-54)
V:i.  =  EaT  :..j  XSj
.J
Marginal  Revenue  (f=p,g)  2n  (II-8)
:;<  up-. ..
MR.f  . =  PN.=,.  (1+1/sI  )
Sectoral  wage  rate  of  the  labor  types  (f  p,g)  2mn  (1-9)
Pitf.  l.  efir  ctotn  (  -9  )
Private  firm  sectoral  output  supplies  n  (II-12)
Sc:.  ( 1  - :.,  * )  (  . - (.,  .. )  ( 1  ""a.,:  ) >,r  .. 3  1 /  .
X  S,.,:.  . 1:  A,..  K::,:  ..  MR,::,  Np, A"  [  ( 1 - a.,.:,  )  ,:, ... / W,::.>  ...  . :]
Private  firm  labor  demands
L,.  =  (1/W  i,:,  )  I:  (1-0.I:,. t)  X,  p.  ±  . 1*  'MRM . * XSr,:,.
Public:  firm  labor-output  ratio
LX,•  =  N,1  II  [  (1/INTi  N  *W,.)  (1-  l  .)  >,.:Ls  R  MR"  l
Pub.lic  firm  capacity  utilization  rate
bmc.  (LX,•  )
Q:.  =  NT,
n  m  (I  I-  :l 1 )
n  (11 -15)
XA  -j  - I.
(11  -14)
45Public  firm  sectoral  output  supplies
XS,  ..  =  s  Q).  K  . MR<i  N
(1-
H  [; ( 1-a-.  ) >  . /(  INTl(i  '  W  ,)  3
Public  firm  labor  demands
L,:.  =  (1 /INTi  W,  ,,)  C  (1-.,.  )  >,  . 3  MR,  XSJ.
Aggregate  Labor  Demands
DLM  =  E  (L.,  +  L •  )
i
Excess  Demands  for  labor
DL_  - SL,  =  0
(I1-16)
1 /  a,  :
ns, )m
n*m ( I I-13)
n  (I1-18')
r  (I1-19)
Sectoral  Profits  of  the  private  enterprise
RP  F'  PFN,..  ,  XSp,  - E  Wp.  ,L,:,.
Sectoral  Profits  of  the  public  enterprise
RGi  =  FPN  j.*  XSc ,.  - Z  W,•iý  gLc,,
Total  sectoral  output  supply




Total:  14n  +  2m  +  4n  m
Endogenous  Variables
X.FA  Sectoral  production  technology  of
the  firm  type  f
L.  ..  Labor  used  in  sectoral  production,  by




nV  Demand  for  Inter'mediate  inputs  n
MR.  i  Marginal  Revenue  of  the  firm  type  f  2n
Wf,-.-m  Sectoral  wage  rate  of  the  labor  type  s  2n* m
employed  by  the  firm  type  f
LX  ,i  PFublic  firm  labor-output  ratio  n
FQ.  Public  firm  capacity  utilization rate  n
XS.L:k.  Sectoral  output  of  the  firm  type  f  2n
L+.'.I  Labor  demand  by  sector  and  type  2n  m
DLV  Aggregate  labor  demand  by  skill-type  m
WI  Average  nominal  wage  rate  by  skil:L  type  m
R.f  . Sectoral  profits  of  enterprises  2n
XS  ,.  Total  sectoral  output  supply  n
Total.  14n  +  2m  +  4nL*  m
Ex::ogenous  Variables  and  Parameters
A-i  Production  function  scale  parameter
Kf:,.  Sectoral  capital  stock  of  the  firm  type  f
(I.  ..  Product:::tion  function  share  parameter
N.,: :  Labor  aggregati on  . functi on  scale  paramreter
.,..  Elasticity  of  labor  aggregate  in  sector  i  with  respect  to
labor  skill  type  s,  employed  in  firm  type  f
SL.,  Aggregate  labor  supply  by  skill  type
t.  Elasticity  of  total  demand  for  the  domestic  product
up.•  :  Firm  type  f,  monopoly  power  utili.ation  parameter
S..  Coefficient  of  proportionality  of  the  sectoral  wage  rate
toc  average  wage  rate  of  labor  type  s  employed  in  firm  type  f
I NT :.  Coef f  i c:i ent  :of  g aver nment  i ntrf  erenc:e  to  the  pu..b:  i c  i rm
bmc::,.  Caoe.f f:  i c:ient  of  "bad  man agement "  in  the  publ ic  f irm
47TABL.E  3:  Product  Markets  and  Foreign  Trade
N
Total  export  subsidy  granted  under  the  tax
rebate  scheme
TSR. . =  tn.  *  ee  *  PWEI  *  ER  E.
Total  tax  allowance  granted  under  the
corporate  income  tax  allowance  scheme
TKA  =  kta  ,*  ees  *  PWEP  *  ER  *  E.
Total  export  subsidy  granted  under  the
corporate  income  tax  allowance  scheme
TSA,  =  tk  *  kta  eei ,  PWE  *  ER  E.
Domestic  currency  value  of  imported
intermediate  inputs  used  for  export  production
EM:I.  =  EPWMj  *  ER  *  d.  m.j  *  aj.  *  E _J
Total  tariff  cost  on  imported  intermediate
inputs  used  for  export  production
TEMI"  =E  tm.j  PFWMj  *  ER  d-j  mj  *  a.ji  *  Ei.
.j
Realized  combined  export  subsidy rate
SE,  =  (tni+tk  kta)eeL
+  Etmj  PWM 4 d,  dj ,*m  aj i  (1/PWE.  )  +  te.±
Export  supply  price  of  domestic  commodity
in  foreign  currency
PWE±  =  P Ds./(1+SEi)  ,  ER
Foreign  demand  for  exports











n (I  -29)
n
48Supply  of  Domestic  goods  used  in  the  domestic  market
n  (II-25)
DS.i.  XS.i.  - E:i
Domes t  i c(  d e  emand  for  i mpor ts  n  (1  -27)
(7-i.
M . =  (PD.  /PM  i)  (  . / 1  .- 6  )  DS
Balance  of  Payments  Equilibrium  (II-37)
EPWM.  'M:I.  - EPWE:  i'E . - F  - WR  =  0
Labor  income  by  skill  type  m  (II-8)
YL.,,.  =(1-ts)  E  (SW  ,  .'L,,...i  +  W,:s.,Lc,  )  +  w, ,*WRER
I.
Capitalist  Income  (II-39)
YK  =  (1-tk)  E  RPF':,.
i.
Public  Enterprise  income  1  (II-40)
YKG  =  (1-tk)  E  RG:,
A.
Government  Income  1  (II-41)
Y 3  =  Ets  1(W  Wj.,  i  L..  :  . ,,  +  W,:,,  L.., . ,)
+  tk  E(RPF'  . +  R(s:.  - kta'ee.i  *PWE:j.  ER  E.i)
+  ECtm:.  PWM.,.  ,ER  M 1--tmj,  'PWMj  ,ER  d :,  m.,  a..j.  EE ]
j
+  Etn.  CPD:  XS:,. -ee  . PFWE,  , ER  E.  E  - Ete:.  F'WE  . ,ER  E:
- E.  Esnp,*  ,PDi ,*XSp,,  +  sn.s  FPDI  *XS,,. I  j  +  YKG  +  F  ER
Total  private  savings  1  (3:II-42)
TPS  =  ES.,  YL,..  +  sk  YK
49Government  investment  fund  1  (II-43)
GIF  =  eCEPD.I  ,  *XS:,  - EE  PCja.jXSI.
I  I  j
Government  savings  rate  1  (11-44)
Sg  = GIF/YG
Labor  consumption  min  (1I-45)
CL,  =  T,..  +  ±  1a/PCs  ( (-S  )YL.  - EPCj.r...)
J
Capitalist  consumption  n  (11-46)
CK'  =  T-,.  +  ,. ./PC.  ((l-sk)YK  - EPC.j  T..j)
Government  consumption  n  (II--47)
CGi  =  qi  (1-'Sg)  YG/PF'C
Total  consumption  demand  n  (11-48)
C.  E CL,.  +  CK.  +  CGB
Real  Private  Investment  n  (I1-49)
NP.  =  H:  (TPS/PK.)
Real  government  investment  n  (11-51)
NGi.  H=  HG  G  (GIF/PKi)
Total  real  investment  to  sector  i  (investment  by  sector  of
desti nati on)  n  (11-52)
NT.I  NPi  +  NGI
Real  investment  demand  (investment  by  sector  of  origin)
n  (11-53)
Z  =.  =  Eb..  *  NTj
Total  demand  for  commodity  i  n  (II-55)
TDI  =  Ci  +  Zi  +  V.
50Domestic  use  ratio  n  (II  -57)
--1
d.  =  ft  (m.  ,  )
Total  domest ic  demand  for  domest i c  product i on  n  (11-58)
DC.A  d.i  *  TD,
Total  demand  for  domestic  production  n  (II-59)
XDi  =  DC,  +-  E:,
Market  clearing  n  (II-60)
XDi  - XSt  =  0
Total:  2  n  +  m  +  n  *m  +  8
Endogenous  Variables
Nu..mmber'
TSR.  ,  TSA  . 2n
Total  export  subsidy  granted  under  the  tax
rebate  and  corporate  income  tax  allowance
schemes,  respecti vel y.
TKA  Total  corporate  income  tax  allowance  granted  1
EM I  Value  of  imported  intermediate  inputs  n
used  for  export  production
TEMI :L  Total  tariff  cost  paid  on  EMIi  n
SE..  Realized  combined  export  subsidy  rate  n
PWEi  Price  of  the  exported  domestic  good  n
E±  Foreign  demand  for  exports  n
DS)  Domestic  supply,  consumed  domestically  n
M.J  Import  demand  n
YL.  Labor  income  by  type  m
51YK  Capitalist  income  1
YKG  Public  enterprise  income  1
YG  Government  income  1
TPS  Total  private  savings  1
GIF  Government  investment fund  1
Sg  Government  savings  rate  1
CLw.t  Consumer  demand  by  labor  type  mn
CK.  Consumer  demand  by  capitalists  n
CGi  Government's  consumption  demand  n
CT  Total  consumption  demand  n
NP.i  Real  private  investment  to  sector  i  n
NGi  Real  government  investment  to  sector  i  n
NT±  Total  real  investment  by  sector  of  destination  n
Zi  Real  investment  demand  by  sector  of  origin  n
TDi  Total  demand  for  product  i  n
de  Domestic  use  ratio  n
DC,  Total  domestic  demand  for  domestic  production  n
XD.  Total  demand  for  domestic  production  n
ER  Exchange  rate  1
PDI  Price  of  the  domestically  produced  good  n
Total:  21n  +  m  +  n'm  +  8
Exogenous  Variables  and  Parameters
eei  Ratio  of  eligible  exports  in  total  exports  benefitting
from  export  incentives
kta  Tax  allowance  rateteE.  Export  subsidy/tax  rate
Ec.::i.  Normal  level  of  exports
AWF'P  Average  world  price  of  aggregated  commodity  i
'q  Elast i city  of  e'x.  port  demand
F  Net  foreign  resource  inflow
WR  Workers'  remittances
t,,  Tax  rate  on  labor  income,  type  s
)i,  Share  of  workers'  remittances  accruing  to  labor  type  s
tk  Tax  rate  on  capitalist  income
S.  Saving  rate  of  labor,  type  s
sk  Capitalist  saving  rate
6  Ratio  of  total  public  investment  to  Gross  Domestic  Product
'Tm.  Absolute  minimum  (subsistence)  level  of  consumption  of
product  i, by  labor  type  s.
'j.  Absolute  m  inimum  (subsistence)  level  of  capital i st
consumption  of  product  i.
,,.  Labor  type  s,  marginal  budget  share  of  product  i
...•  Capita:l.  ists'  marginal  budget  share  of  product  i
q,  Government's  consumption  expenditures  - share  of  product  i
H:L  Frivate  investment-allocation  share
HG.  Public  investment-allocation  share
There  are  a  total  of  41n  +  3m  +  5n'm  +  9  equations  and  41n
+  3m  +  5n*m  +  8  endogenous  variables.  However,  not  all
of  the  equations  are  independent.  The  n  excess  demand
equations  can  determine  only  n-:l  relative  prices,  and  to  do  so
one  has  to  specify  a  normalization  equation  to  set  the  absolute
price  level.Footnotes:
(1)  For  a  recent  survey  on  CGE-type  Modelling  see:  Shoven  &
Whalley  (1984).
(2)  My  sole  purpose  in  this  introduction  is  to  provide  a  bird's-
eye-view  comparison  of  various  multisector  planning  models.  The
interested  reader  can  find  a  comprehensive  survey  of  Linear
Programming  Models  in  Taylor  (1979);  and  of  planning  models  in
general,  in  Blitzer,  Clark  &  Taylor  (1975).
(3)  For  a  more  formal  discussion  on  this  proposition,  see  for
example,  Intriligator  (1971).
(4)  Dervis, de Melo and  Robinson,  1982,  p.  132.  This
observation clearly applies to  the general  structure of
most  of  the  LP  models.  Yet,  for purposes of  completeness
we  need to  stress the  existance of  a body of  literature
which  attempts to  compute the  competitive market
equilibria by  means  of  extensions of  a  mathematical
programming  model  (e.g.,  see  Goreaux  (1977);  Manne  et.al.
(1978);  Norton  &  Scandizzo  (1981)  ).  The Goreaux:  and
Manne et.  al.  studies  utilize successive recursive
sequences  of  linear  programming  solutions,  and  can  be
regarded  as  lying  halfway  between  the  LP  and CGE type
models.
The Norton  &. Scandizzo  study,  on  the  other  hand,  tries
to mimic competitive  equilibria  by  directly  constructing
the essential  conditions  of  such  equilibria  as  inequality
constraints  in  the  primal  problem;  and  thus,  their
procedure  can  be  utilized  to  yield  a  non-recursive  linear
54programming  solution.  To  fit  the  model  into  the  LP
framework,  they  first  employ  grid  linearization
tec:::hn iq ues  on  norn  inear  constraints.  TIhei r  max i.mand  is
de:fined  as  the  excess  of  ex.penditures  over  factor  inc.omes
and  attains  a  value  of  zero  at  the  optmumL.  Also  at  the
optimum,  the  dual  shadow  prices  of  resource  constraints
turn  out  to  be  equal  to  the  primal  variables  which
represent  the  rate  of  return  on  factors.
Innovative  as  it  is,  their  model  suffers  from  the  implicit
condition  that  no  resource  is  allowed  to  be  underemployed;
thus  to  have  a  shadow  value  of  zero  at  the  optimum
leaving  its  owner  with  a  nill  level  of  income.  Yet,  it  is
a  reality  of  life  that  in  many  developing  countries,
certain  resources  (particularly  labor)  remain  to  be
underutilized.  Thus, the  core  of  the  problem,  that  is,
to  incorporate  the  sets  of  price-incentives  as  essential
tools  of  poli cy-makers  in  decentralized,  mixed  economies
with  a  general  equilibrium  framework,  still  remains  to  be
addressed  in  this  model  as  well..
(5)  For  derivation,  see  e.g.  Varian  (1978).  The  above  form  is
taken  from  Dervis  et.  al.  (1982).
(6)  See,  Appendi x  to  Chapter  2  in  Dervis  et  al.  (1982)  for  a
discussion  of  these  conditions.  For  the  original  statement,
see:  Hawkins,  D  &  H.  A.  Simon  "Note:  Some  conditions  of
Macroeconomic  Stability"  (1.949)  E.onEmetrca,  17,  J ul y-Oct  ,
pp.  245-48B
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On~(7)  The Model  captures such  intertemporal  innovations  in  the
Dynamic  Stage with the  explicit  specification of  the
endogenous private investment  share  parameters  (see
equations  III  -5).
(8)  For  a discussion  of  various solution  strategies and  solution
algorithms on  the  iteration of  prices,  see Dervis  et.  al.
(1982, Appendix  B);  and  Adelman  and  Robinson  (1978, Appendix  B)
and  the  references therein  cited.
(9)  For  a discussion  on  the strategy for  construction  dynamic,
economy-wide  models  of  developing  countries,  see  Robinson
(1976).
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59Appendix  A:  Derivation  of  the  Linear  Expenditure  System
In  this  Appendix  I  will  present  the  derivation  of  the
private  consumption  equations  (II-45,-46)  in  more  detail.  For
applied  work  linearity  of  such  equations  provides  a  distinct
advantage  and  this  is  one  of  the  reasons  of  the  popularity  of
linear  expenditure  systems  (LES).  The  other  advantage  of  the  LES
is  that  it  is  relatively  easy  to  estimate  its  parameters  with'
modest  data  requirements.
This  presentation  follows  that  of  Taylor  (1979);  for  another
method  on  deriving  linear  consumption  functions  the  reader  may
refer  to  the  discussion  in  Adelman  &  Robinson  (1978,  Appendix
A).  The  notation  used  here  pertains  on.ly to  this  Appendix.
First,  we  begin  with  the  conventional  hypothesis  that  each
consumer  group  (m  - labor  categories  and  capitalists,  a  total  of
m  +  1)  shares  a  common  utility  function  and  thus,  can  be  analyzed
by  the  actions  of  a  representative  consumer.  Dropping  the
subscripts  s  and  k  that  distinguish  different  consumer
categories,  the  preference  map  is  assumed  to  be  represented  by
the  following  function:
LU  =  E  .1. log(C  - Tr)  (A-1)
where  C±.  is  the  consumption  of  i'th  commodity  and  s.  and  Ti  are
the  parameters  of  the  utility  function.  If  you  recall,  I  have
let  ,  3±  to  stand  for  the  marginal  budget  share  of  product  i  and  T.
to  denote  the  "subsistence  minima"  of  product  i  in  physical
t er ms.
60Assuming  non-satiation  we  can  set  up  the  budget  constraint
of  the  representative  c'onsumer  as  an  equality,
EP..  '  C-.  =  Y  (A-2)
where  Y  is  the  total  money  income  of  the  consumer  and  P:.  is  the
markl:et  price  of  the  i -th  commodity.  The  first  order  conditions
of  the  consumer's  problem  yield.
i.  ":= XP"'j.  (C.  -"  T..)  (A-3)
where  >  is  the  f:amil. iar  L.agr'ange  mul.tiplier..  In  our  c:ontext  we
wi.ll  i nterpret  it  as  the  "margi nal  uti  ].i ty  of  income  "
To  solve  the  system  (A-3),  we  will  resort  to  a  normalization
rule  which  states  that  summatio(n  of  1..  over  i  adds  up  to  unity,
Thus,
1  =  X  (  =  ),  (EPiC.  - F'.  T(. )  (A-4)
Let  us  denote  EF'P..i  by  S,  the  total  cost  of  subsistence
1.
consumption  basket,  then  from  (A-4)  we  carn  solve  for  X,
S=  i/Y-S  (A-5)
Substituting  (A-5)  into  (A- 3)  we  get  a  specific  formula  for
demand  of  commodity  i,
C.L  =  T.-  . +  (  ./PF'.  )  (Y-S)  (A-6)
which  is  the  consumption  equation  I  have  used  in  the  Model.
Given  data  on  a•.era.ge.  budget  shares,  cX..  (<a.:.  =  P  Ci/Y),
and  :i. n come  e lastic:ities,  'n... ,  we  can  get  an  estimat e  of4
61the  marginal  budget  shares,  B  ,
•i  =  C  /  Y  ./  *  Y/C,  (A-7)
and
*t  == aC,./aY  *  F'  (A-8)
we  have
j.  =  C L  ,  'OA  (A-9)
which  provides  a  straightforward  estimate  of  ±  on  the  basis  of
the  estimates  of  n.i
The  LES  specification  also  provides  an  expression  of  the
minimum  subsistence  parameter,To,  as  a  function  of  the  other
parameters  of  the  model.  To  do  this,  however,  I  first  introduce
another  parameter,  8,  which  stands  for  elasticity  of  marginal
utility  of  income  with  respect  to  income,  first  used  by  Ragner
Frisch  (1959).  We  thus  have,
8  =  dX/dY  Y/>,  =  -Y/YrS  (A-10)
Substituting  the  consumer-demand  function  (A-6)  into  the
income-elasticity  equation  (A-7),  we  get:
'qi  =  e  Y/(PF'  *  Ti  +  (Y-S))  3  (A-11)
solving  for  :..,
i  =  (Y/FP  )  (cLi  +  B<:/e)  (A-12)
which  can  be  derived  easily.  Expression  (A-12)  can  be  written  in
even  a  more  compact  form  by  letting  a  =  -1/e  =(Y-S)/Y,  which  gives
the  ratio  of  the  consumer's  excess  income  over  the  subsistence
level  to  the  income  level.  Following  this  definition,  a has
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Since  by  definition,been  usually  referred  as  the  superenumerary  income  ratio.  Lance
Taylor  reports  that  conventionally  a  takes  a  value  of  about  ) .5
for  most  consutmer  groups.  Thus,  having  in  f ormat ion  on  a  the
subsistence  parameter  T.  can  be  easily  estimated  using  the
estimate  of  i,.
Using  a,  we  can  also  derive  neat  expressions  for  own-  and
cross-  price  el.asticities  of  demand.  Differentiating  consumer
demand  equation  (A-6)  and  using  the  definition  of  price
elasticities  we  get,
SJ.  -'1  :  (PF.  +  r, ./Y  +  - )  (A-i3)
.j  . =  -nl.  (Pj.r../Y)  (A-14)
where  e.L  and  E.L j  are  own-  and  cross-  price  elasticities  of
demand,  respectively.  In  equation  (A-13)  the  first  term,
SIPL  (Pi..  /Y)  ,  gives  the  income  effect  of  a  change  price,  P,.
The  second  term,  'r•i.  measures  the  substitution  effect.  As  can
be  seen  as  a  gets  smaller  (i.e.  the  smaller  the  excess  of  income
over  subsistence  level)  ,  so  does  the  consumer's  substitution
response  to  a  percentage  change  in  Pi..
63Appendix B:  Endogenous Derivation  of  the Own-Price Elasticity
of  Domestic Demand
X  x:)
In  this Appendix  we seek  for  an  expression  for  ..  -own
domestic  price elasticity of  aggregate demand for  the domestic
commodity- which can be  generated  within the Model
endogenously.  The  calculation of  this  parameter  bears
importance,  because  for  sectors  which  entail  monopoly  power  in
their  product markets, labor  hire,  and  thus,  output  supply
decisions  will  depend  upon the  numerical  value  of  the  elasticity
of  the  total  demand  curve facing  the monopolist.  It  needs to be
noted that,  for  the most  part, the  Appendix  is  written  in  the
spirit  of  a suggestive essay.  It  needs to  be amended  in  the
realm  of  the model  construction and  available  data.  Of  course,
XY  X.4
ýi  can as  well  be  estimated  econometrically in  a  separate  study
and can  be fed  into the Model  directly.  Yet,  this Imethod  may be
harder  and  less  reliable than  it seems,  due  to the  high  level  of
aggregation  of  products  in  each  sector.  At  such high  levels of
aggregation,  the econometric fitness and  the validity of  the
numerical  value estimated  for  :L  may  be questionable.
Further,  since CGE type  Models  are  actually  "consistency"
models,  it  will  be a more  sound strategy  to  let  the Model
derive its parameters endogenously as much  as possible and
to rely less on  parameters derived from outside models which  use
a different methodology.
There  is  yet  a third  possible  "method" for  finding a value
for  s.:  ,  and  that  is  to make  an  "educated guess"  on  likely values
64of  s..  For  example,  the  Adelman  ,  Robinson  (1978)  Model  which
has  as  well  incorporated  monopoly  power  in  certain  product
markets,  tried  to  handle  the  problem  this  way.  Retaining  the
"co-nsi. stenc:y  spirit"  of  the  Model  and  asking  it  to  originate  the
relevant  parameter  within  its  structure  is  certainly  a  superior
method  over  this  option  as  well.
Then,  to  recapitulate,  aggregate  demand  o-f  the  i-th  Domestic
Commodity  is:
XD±  =  d ,  ECL  .i.  +CK J.  CG.i +Z .+V.  ]  +  E:<  (B-1)
Therefore  the  elasticity  of  aggregate  demand  of  the  domestic.
commodity  i  with  respect  to  own  domestic  price  is  a  weighted
average  of  the  elasticities  of  its  components:
X  g.  C  I....  C.  I::.  C  03
x  D
i.  dI  >  l.  d-.  C L.i.L /L  XI)J  ±  Cf:  / XI) 1  +L  x  f.  (  /  (  41--  2  1
+si  Z.  /XD.  +  4  i  VI  /XD,.  +  '.  Ei/XD:)
C1t....  (::;H
Since  the  co)nsumption  functions  are  o.f  the  LES  type,  g:,  and  E.
can  be  calculated  using  the  relevant  results  o.f  the  previous
Appenedix.  Thus,
C,  I....  C:,  L...  F;C"  l
....  =  -I  v-y  . EF'C.  I  /YL,.B  +  (YL.u-EP'C..j  '~,,  . )/YL..3  ]  ,  F>.,  (B-3)
;  ::  C:; I-::  F  (
t  =  -v,  CF'C.  ,  rtK..  /YK  +  (YK-EPC:F  ,  I r,,  ) /YK3  ,-.O,  (B-4)
CL..  C.K:
where  ,,.  and  .,  are  income  elasticities  of  consumption  clemand
of  :Iabor  type-s,  and  of  the  capital  ists,  respectively.  Note  thatthe  system  of  consumption  demands  is  originally  specified  as  a
function  of  PC~'s  (the  composite  good  prices);  and  yet,  we
need  to  have  an  expression  for  the  elasticity  of  consumption
demand  with  respect  to  the  dom.estic ...  price.  Thus,  we  use
t.i . =  (  CL.  /F'PC  )  * (PCi../CL.B  )  * (FPC./F'PD.  )  (F'PD./PC,. )  (B-5)
which  explains  the  presence  of  tFOD,±  (the  elasticity  of  composite
price with respect  to the domestic  price)  in  (B-3) and  (8-4).
The  sectoral  government consumption  demands are  given  by  the
fixed  share-coefficients.  Thus:
0  Mt-  F:'  C
i  (-I)  F-DI  (B-6)
In  order  to find  the elasticity of  investment demand  we
first begin  by  writing  the  components  of  Z±  more  clearly:
Z.  =  Ebij  E  (HjTFPS +  HGj ,(  IF)/PKj]3
-i
SEb,. j  (Hj*TPS + HGj*'GIF)/( Eb  .. ,*PCJ  (-7)
j  *I.,
Thus:




s..ZC  ==  (Za./PCFC  )  * (PC./Za)
=  -E  Cbi.  (Hj'*TPS+HGj  *,GIF)  (PCF:',/Z.)/(b<Eb.  i..  F'*PC,:)
.j  I-,:
= -E  [  (b.,.../PK:  )  ,  Z.. 3  (F'C..  /Z.  )  (B-8)
.i
66Then,  all  we  need  is  to  solve  for:
z  r  c;::
t.i J . P-,  C:  '  F  . (.  - 9')
The  demand  for  inter'med iate  goods  is  given  by  fi.xed  i nput-
output  coefficients;  and  will  be  assumed  to  be  non-responsive  to
price  changes.
Actually,  any  change  in  the  domestic  relative  prices  will
induce  an  output  effec:t  and  the  changing  output  supply  decisi-ons
will  result  in  different  quantities  of  intermediate  goods
demanded.  ThIhus,  we  m..st  have:
?V.t /  PD•  :  E  a,.,  (<XSj/9F'D,.)  (B-10)
where  the  term  in  the  parantheses  (the  indirect  effect  of  the
cross-prices  on  output  supp.Lies)  can  be  deduced  from  the  factor
markets  through:
SX S.  /  PD :,  (  X  S  . /  L  .. , )  ( B  1 )
IT  E (  L..  /  L.,  .. )  ( d L  / d W  d  . ....  ,.  * d W  ..  ,,,/ ld  D  ) :i
*>Ui
The  latter  component  (dL...j,,/dW..i,,;  dW.js,/dPD:s.)  is  embedded  in  the
solution  algorithm  for  clearing  the  labor  markets  and  yet  is  not
observable  in  a  functional  formm.  In  what  follows,  we  are  not
able  to  make  use  of  the  functional  relationship  (B-11  ).
(1)  I  am  indebted  to  Prof•  T".  Roe  f:or  his  comments  on  this
point.
67The  assumption  that  the  elasticity  of  intermediate  demand  is
XT)
zero,  clearly  puts  a  downward  bias  on  the  aggregate  value  of  .
Yet,  as  we  argued,  due  to  the  fixed-coefficients  technology,  the
overall  price  sensitivity  of  intermediate  demands  have  to  be  very
low  and  the  incurred  bias  shouldnot  be  substantial.
P'C;
Our  final  task  is  to  derive  an  expression  for  to,-  .
Since,
aT  (l-a.-  )  i.A  (  -a•  )  1/I  -a.,
FPC  =  1/B.  tE6:.  PMi  +  (1-$.)  PD,.  J  (B-12)
we  have
a  a  i.t
9aPCC  /sPD  =  (PC:.  /PD  )  (l/B.)  <(-8<)  (B-13)
Thus,
P' C
~t.,  ...  =  (PCi.  /'  FPDL  )  (PD  /PCF . )
=  (PCi/PD,.)  (1/Bi)  (<-8,.)  (B-14)
which  completes  our  derivation.  It  should  be  noted,  however,
that  in  spite  of  its  general  stance,  this  exercise  still  entails
partial  equilibrium  characteristics.  We  have  not  sought  for  an
expression  on  the  likely  general  equilibrium  effects  of  PDi  on
overall  budgets  of  the  economic  agents  which  work  through  the
factor  markets  and  derived  factor  incomes.  These  effects  have  to
be  found  in  the  solution  algorithm  and  the  overall  interaction  of
all  markets  with  a  complex  set  of  interlinkages,  and  technically
68cannot  be  identifi  ed  in  a  si ng le  --or  set  of--  functi onal  form (s).
The  inclur'red  bias  in  this  manner  may  or  may  not  be  substantial
depending  on  n  the  spec :i. f ic  ccase  at  hand  and  the  r-esults  snhoauld  be
.i nte rpreted  wi th  c:aut  ti  on.
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